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DRAWING THE LINE: WHITFORD V. GILL AND THE SEARCH 
FOR MANAGEABLE PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING 
STANDARDS 
Abigail Aguilera* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The constitution grants legislatures the authority to create voting 
districts and apportion representatives among them.1 This grant of power 
to bodies imbued with political interests inevitably presents the 
possibility that politics and partisan interests will enter the districting 
equation. However, deciding claims that are unfairly influenced by 
partisan politics presents a difficult problem for the Supreme Court. As 
such, the federal courts have largely refused to hear issues of 
malapportionment and gerrymandering.2 Malapportionment is defined 
as an unequal population distribution across voting districts so that the 
votes of people in lower population districts have greater influence on 
electoral outcomes than those in more densely populated districts.3 
Gerrymandered districts can have populations of equal sizes but the 
manner in which the district is drawn affects the weight of a person’s 
vote.4  
 In the 1960’s, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
malapportionment and the measure of constitutional representation 
required in districting,5 and in the 1980’s the Court first addressed the 
issue of partisan gerrymandering.6 However, ever since entering this 
fray, the Court’s articulations regarding partisan gerrymandering have 
been confused at best, and at worst an implicit license for district 
drafters to freely engage in extensive partisan gerrymandering. 
In Whitford v. Gill,7 a three-judge district court for the Western 
District of Wisconsin addressed claims of partisan gerrymandering by 
 
* Associate Member, 2016-2017 University of Cincinnati Law Review. 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
 2. See infra notes 13-18 and accompanying text. 
 3. Mitchell Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 Tex. L. Rev 781, 785 (2004-2005); 
“Malaportionment involves the creation or preservation of electoral districts of different population 
sizes, so that the ration of representatives to voters varies across districts. Gerrymanders can involve 
districts of roughly equivalent, even equal population, sizes.” Id. at 785 n.20. 
 4. Id. at 785. 
 5. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (holding that district malapportionment was a 
justiciable issue); Reynolds v. Sims 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964) (establishing that the Constitution 
required that each person’s vote carries the same weight). 
 6. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 113 (1986). 
 7. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016). 
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the Republican controlled state legislature.8 The Wisconsin district court 
utilized a three-part test briefed by the plaintiffs as an appropriate 
measure of impermissible partisan gerrymandering of the state’s voting 
districts.9  
In light of the Whitford decision, this case note addresses why the 
three-part test applied in that case promises an appropriate measure for 
determining impermissible partisan gerrymandering. Section II of this 
note explores the history of partisan gerrymandering in subsection  (a) 
and then addresses the circumstances and facts of Whitford in subsection 
(b). Section III addresses why the standard applied in Whitford presents 
a judicially manageable standard that should be adopted for evaluation 
of partisan gerrymandering claims. Section III first examines the 
important need to address claims of partisan gerrymanders, subsection 
(a), and then addresses the advantages of the Whitford test as compared 
with possible standards the Court has expressed a desire for in the past, 
in subsection (b). Finally, Section III concludes by addressing the added 
advantage of the Whitford standard in dealing with partisan 
gerrymandering and technologic advances in district drawing. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
This section first explores the history of gerrymandering, as well as 
the facts of Whitford v. Gill. Subsection (a) of this section defines and 
explains the origins of gerrymandering and the rise of the justiciability 
of district malapportionment. Additionally, subsection (a) seeks to 
provide some context regarding partisan gerrymandering and the Court’s 
recent jurisprudence in this area. Part (b) of this section addresses the 
case of Whitford v. Gill, what the Wisconsin court decided in that matter 
and its relevance to partisan gerrymandering. 
A.  What Is Gerrymandering? 
The term gerrymandering originated in 1812 when, the then 
Massachusetts Governor, Elbridge Gerry, drew a voting district 
resembling a salamander for the benefit of his own political party.10 
Thus, gerrymandering is the process of dividing districts within a state 
or territory, but in such a way that achieves a political or personal gain.11 
Gerrymandering can, and has been, employed over time to achieve a 
 
 8. See id. at 853-56.  
 9. Id. at 854-855. 
 10. Whitney M. Eaton, Where Do We Draw the Line? Partisan Gerrymandering and the State of 
Texas, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 1193, 1193 (2006.) 
 11. Id.  
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variety of nefarious goals. Not only have voting districts been 
challenged as attempts to achieve certain political majorities in 
legislative bodies,12 but also for impermissibly employing racial 
considerations in districting.13  
1.  The Rise of Challenges to District Apportionment 
For more than 174 years14 the Supreme Court treated cases 
challenging district apportionments as non-justiciable “political 
questions”15 and would not adjudicate them.16 From the end of the 
industrial revolution and through World War II, large population 
disparities developed between voting districts, exacerbating the problem 
of district malapportionment.17 Left unchecked, politicians had little 
incentive to redistrict, as failure to change districts would maintain the 
status quo.18 The Court’s approach to malapportionment claims during 
this period was best characterized by Justice Frankfurter, who warned 
that the Court “ought not to enter this political thicket.”19  
Not until Baker v. Carr20 did the Supreme Court find that claims 
regarding the unconstitutionality of legislative apportionment presented 
a justiciable question.21  The outcome of Baker lead to a string of cases 
alleging vote dilution due to district apportionment that violated the 
equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution.22  
In subsequent cases, the Court elaborated on the Baker standard by 
finding that the notion of equality of votes among voters was to be 
embodied in the one person, one vote standard.23 One person, one vote 
reflects the notion that equal representation means that each person’s 
vote carries equal weight and is rooted in the idea that voting is a 
 
 12. See Vieth v. Jublirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
 13. See. e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
 14. Eaton, supra note 10, at 1196. 
 15. A political question arises when a case presents a matter that under the Constitution is 
committed to another branch of the government which the Court adjudicating would impinge on the 
separation of powers. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
 16. E.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).  
 17. Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Synder Jr. THE END OF INEQUALITY: ONE PERSON, ONE 
VOTE AND TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS, 39-40 (2008); See also William F. Swindler, 
Reapportionment: Revisionism or Revolution, 43 N.C. L. REV. 55, 60-61 (1964-1965) (discussing how 
the 1930 decennial census confirmed the shifting population trends in the years leading up to World War 
I from rural to urban populations). 
 18. Ansolabehere, supra note 17, at 40. 
 19. Colegrove, 328 U.S.  at 556. 
 20. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 21. Id. at 237. 
 22. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983). 
 23. Gray, 372 U.S. at 381. 
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fundamental right that enables the preservation of other rights,24 and that 
the weight of a citizen’s vote cannot be dependent on where that person 
happens to live.25 In addition to requiring that voting redistricting 
standards adhere to the one person, one vote standard, other permissible 
traditional redistricting criteria have been recognized as evidence of 
permissible district apportionment.26 Such criteria include geographic 
continuity and compactness of districts, preserving communities of 
interest, and nesting.27  
2.  Issues with Partisan Gerrymandering in Particular  
As its name alludes, the concept of partisan gerrymandering springs 
from the idea that district lines were drawn in such a way so as to favor 
a certain political party over another by ensuring victories in those 
districts. Thus, “partisan gerrymandering is gaining through 
discretionary districting an unjustifiable advantage for one political 
party as opposed to the others.”28  
There are two methods generally used to achieve partisan 
gerrymandering when drawing districting lines: district drawers may 
either “pack” or “crack” districts.29 Packing a district allows for 
concentration of one party’s supporters in only a few districts; thus, 
while the party wins an overwhelming majority in those districts, the 
districts are few.30 Conversely, cracking requires district lines to be 
drawn in such a way that the opposing party’s voters are split into large 
minorities across various districts and are unable to achieve a majority 
of the votes in any district.31 District drawers wishing to achieve partisan 
gerrymandering will often employ both of these techniques to achieve 
their aims.32 
Partisan gerrymandering often leads to litigation because it 
undermines the notion of equality amongst voters.33 In the United States, 
representation is divided among geographic regions, with elections in 
 
 24. Christopher M. Burke, THE APPEARANCE OF EQUALITY: RACIAL GERRYMANDERING, 
REDISTRICTING, AND THE SUPREME COURT 60 (1999); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 560. 
 25. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 567. 
 26. Ethan Weiss, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Elusive Standard, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
693, 697 (2013). 
 27. Id.  
 28. Charles Backstrom, et al., Issues in Gerrymandering: An Exploratory Measure of Partisan 
Gerrymandering Applied to Minnesota, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1121,1129 (1977-78). 
 29. Michael E. Lewyn, How to Limit Gerrymandering, 45 FLA. L. REV. 403, 406 (1993). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text. 
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these geographic regions typically based on a winner-take-all system.34 
Thus, if partisan gerrymandering occurred in the drawing of district 
lines, then a party can exploit the winner-take-all system to achieve a 
majority of votes in each district, while still representing a minority of 
the popular vote.35  This outcome is problematic for members of a 
political group that fall victim to partisan gerrymandering, who attempt 
to bring claims based on this disadvantage. Unfortunately, the history of 
these claims in the Court has resulted in a string of plurality opinions 
that articulated confused and divided views of the issue. 
3.  Troubles Adjudicating Partisan Gerrymandering 
For many years after the pronouncement of Baker, the Court did not 
address the question of partisan gerrymandering, instead finding many 
cases that presented questions of pure partisan gerrymandering as not 
justiciable.36 However, during this time the Court in Gaffney v. 
Cummings37 noted that, even though a districting plan might be 
acceptable under the one person, one vote equal population distribution 
standards, it could still be unconstitutional because the districts were 
created in such a way so as to dilute the voting strength of certain racial 
or political groups.38  
When the Court finally directly addressed the issue of partisan 
gerrymandering, it did so in the case of Davis v. Bandemer.39 Bandemer 
involved claims that a 1981 state apportionment diluted votes of Indiana 
Democrats in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.40 The district 
court invalidated the districting statute, finding that the plan had a 
discriminatory effect on Democratic voters by adversely affecting their 
proportional voting influence and that such a discriminatory plan could 
not be tolerated.41 Upon review, the Supreme Court declined to say that 
claims based on partisan gerrymandering were never justiciable.42 
Instead, while justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause, such claims 
must, as a threshold matter, demonstrate discriminatory vote dilution in 
order to establish a prima facie case under that clause.43  The Court then 
 
 34. Weiss, supra note 26, at 696. 
 35. See id.  
 36. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 121 (1986). 
 37. 412 U.S. 735 (1973). 
 38. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 751 (1973) (quoting Forston v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 
439 (1965)). 
 39. 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
 40. Id. at 113. 
 41. Id. at 117. 
 42. Id. at 113, 124.  
 43. Id. at 143. 
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reversed the district court ruling, finding that the showing of an adverse 
effect in Bandemer did not meet the threshold requirement for 
establishing a prima facie case.44   
However, eighteen years later, the Court changed course on this issue 
in Vieth v. Jubelirer.45 In Vieth, a four-justice plurality, led by Justice 
Scalia, announced that the issue of partisan gerrymandering was in fact 
not justiciable, and that Bandemer was wrongly decided.46  The Court 
criticized the ruling enunciated by the plurality in Bandemer on the 
grounds that it had only lead to years of confusion in lower courts, and 
that it presented a judicially unmanageable standard.47 Justice Kennedy 
provided the needed fifth vote to create a majority in Vieth, but not 
because he believed partisan gerrymanders to be non-justiciable (like the 
plurality) but because he did not believe a manageable standard had 
been present in Vieth.48 Kennedy noted the unfairness of categorically 
deciding that partisan gerrymandering cases cannot be heard, while still 
addressing other types of apportionment cases.49 He concluded that 
because “no such standard [had] emerged in [Vieth] should not be taken 
to prove that none will emerge in the future.”50  
Only two months after Veith was decided in 2004, the Supreme Court 
decided Cox. v. Larios51 in 2005 and then League of United Latin 
American Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry52 in 2006.  The collective effect of 
the decisions in these cases only muddied the waters further regarding 
partisan gerrymandering. In Cox, the Court affirmed a Georgia district 
court’s ruling that the legislative apportionment plan for both the 
Georgia’s House of Representatives and Senate violated the one person, 
one vote principle.53 However, Stevens, in his concurrence, emphasized 
the notion that the present lack of judicially manageable standards to 
address the issue of partisan gerrymandering did not “justify a refusal 
‘to condemn even the most blatant violations of a state legislature’s 
fundamental duty to govern impartially.’”54  
In LULAC, claims were brought forth alleging that the Texas mid-
decennial redistricting plan constituted a partisan gerrymander as well as 
 
 44. Id. at 113, 143. 
 45. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).  
 46. Id. at 281. 
 47. Id. at 281-83.  
 48. Id. at 310. 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. at 311. 
 51. 542 U.S. 947 (2004). 
 52. 548 U.S. 399 (2006). 
 53. Cox, 542 U.S. at 947. 
 54. Id. at 950-51 (J. Stevens, concurring (quoting Vieth v. Jublirer, 541 U.S. 267, 341 (2004))). 
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a violation the protections of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.55  In regard 
to the partisan gerrymandering claim, the appellants argued that the mid-
decennial redistricting plan enacted by the Texas legislature was only 
motivated by partisan objectives, violating the Equal Protection Clause 
and the First Amendment.56 The Court produced yet another confusing 
discussion on partisan gerrymandering. Justice Stevens dissented and 
suggested a new approach for managing partisan gerrymandering, while 
Ginsburg and Breyer continued to assert that such claims were 
justiciable.57 
Thus, while the Supreme Court has attempted to stay out of fights 
regarding partisan gerrymandering claims, “[t]he Justices have 
maintained they have authority over these matters, but have failed to 
establish a simple standard analogous to one person, one vote that would 
clear up the controversies.”58 Rather than clarifying the issue of partisan 
gerrymandering, the Court’s recent jurisprudence on the issue since 
Bandemer has only created confusion. With no clear statement on the 
issue, due to the Court’s ability to produce only a string of plurality 
opinions on the matter, lower courts were left to question what standards 
should be applied. 
B.  The Case of Whitford v. Gill59 
1.  Voting and Apportionment in Wisconsin 
In the state of Wisconsin, voting districts are apportioned by the 
legislature after each decennial census.60 From about 1980 until 2010, 
reapportionment in Wisconsin was marked by periodic court 
intervention and court-implemented districting plans.61 However, in 
2010 Wisconsin Republicans controlled both bodies of the Wisconsin 
legislature and the governorship, leading them to believe that a new 
legislatively enacted redistricting plan was possible.62 
The Republican leaders in the legislature appointed staff to work on 
this new apportionment plan with local attorneys and Professor Michael 
Keith Gaddie from the University of Oklahoma.63  Using redistricting 
 
 55. League of United Latin American Citizens, 548 U.S. at 408. 
 56. Id. at 416-17. 
 57. See Weiss, supra note 26, at 705. 
 58. Ansolabehere, supra note 17, at 247. 
 59. 218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016). 
 60. Id. at 844. 
 61. Id. at 845-46. 
 62. Id. at 846. 
 63. Id. at 846-47. 
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software and the help of Professor Gaddie, a new district map was 
created, the “Team Map.”64 Professor Gaddie’s analysis of the Team 
Map revealed that under this plan, Republicans would maintain majority 
control of Wisconsin in any possible voting scenario.65 This plan was 
subsequently introduced as a bill and was passed by the Senate and 
Assembly and signed into law by the Governor as Wisconsin Act 43.66 
2.  The Claim Against Act 43 
 The plaintiffs in Whitford resided in various counties throughout 
Wisconsin, all of them supporters of the Democratic Party in Wisconsin, 
as well as almost always voting for Democratic candidates during 
elections.67 The defendants were all members of the Wisconsin Election 
Committee.68 
The plaintiffs claimed that Act 43 violated their First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights because Act 43 discriminated against Democratic 
voters by diluting their votes as compared with Republican voters.69 In 
evaluating the validity of the plaintiffs’ claim, the court engaged in a 
detailed analysis of case law addressing both malapportionment and 
partisan gerrymandering claims.70 The court concluded that, while still 
developing and in a state of flux, the case law did reveal that the First 
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause protected a citizen from 
discrimination in regard to the weight of the vote based on the citizen’s 
political preferences.71  
The district court then stated, “the First Amendment and the Equal 
Protection Clause prohibit a redistricting scheme which (1) intended to 
place a severe impediment on the effectiveness of the votes of individual 
citizens on the basis of their political affiliation, (2) has that effect, and 
(3) cannot be justified on other, legitimate legislative grounds.”72 The 
court then applied this standard to the facts of the case. 
3.  Discriminatory Intent or Purpose in Redistricting 
The first prong of the test, as announced in Whitford, requires that 
there be a showing that discriminatory intent or purpose motivated the 
 
 64. Id. at 851. 
 65. Id. at 852. 
 66. Id. at 853. 
 67. Id. at 853-54. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. at 863. 
 70. Id. at 864-83. 
 71. Id. at 883-84. 
 72. Id. 
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redistricting plan in question.73 At the same time the court in Whitford 
recognized that some partisanship was permissible in the drawing of 
district lines but analyzed when the influence of this partisanship 
crossed from acceptable into excessive and discriminatory.74  
The defendants argued that because Act 43 complied with traditional 
principles of apportionment that there was no discriminatory intent as a 
matter of law.75 The court rejected this assertion and instead focused on 
the events leading up to the enactment of Act 43 for indications that the 
drafters had employed impermissible discriminatory intent when 
creating the new districting map.76 Evidence from the trial indicated that 
the drafters worked with Professor Gaddie and his regression models in 
order to generate a map that would ensure Republican Party control of 
the state legislature for the next decennial period.77 The court rejected 
the defendants’ claims that the evidence was inadequate to establish 
discriminatory intent,78 and instead found that the focal point of the 
drafters, when creating the new districting map, was to ensure 
Republican control in the legislature.79 The court then concluded that 
Act 43 “had as one of its objectives entrenching the Republicans’ 
control of the Assembly.”80 
4.  Discriminatory Effect of the Redistricting 
The court found that the discriminatory effect of Act 43’s 
apportionment was evidenced through the election results of the 
Wisconsin elections of 2012 and 2014. 81 In the 2012 election, the 
Republicans won sixty seats in the Assembly, but only 48.6 percent of 
the statewide vote; and in the 2014 election they won sixty-three seats 
with 52 percent of the vote.82  Moreover, in the 2012 election, 
Democrats won 51.4 percent of the statewide vote while only winning 
thirty-nine Assembly seats; and in 2014, they won forty-eight percent of 
the vote, which garnered them just thirty-six seats.83  
 
 73. Id. at 884-85. 
 74. Id. at 885-87. 
 75. Id. at 887. 
 76. Id. at 890. 
 77. Id. at 891. 
 78. The defendants alleged that the evidence was inadequate because (1) there were errors in the 
models making them unreliable, (2) the models were merely analysis of the averages of past elections 
applied to new districts, and (3) that the partisan intent in this case was not invidious because the 
districts complied with traditional districting principles. Id at 895-897. 
 79. Id at 897-98. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 898-99. 
 83. Id. at 901. 
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The court also found the plaintiffs’ use of the efficiency gap (“EG”) 
as intriguing evidence that the Democrat’s voting rights were burdened 
under Act 43.84 The plaintiffs demonstrated at trial that, based on the 
EG, the Republican Party won thirteen and ten Assembly seats in excess 
of what they likely would have won based on the percentage of the vote 
garnered in the 2012 and 2014 elections, respectively.85 The court 
concluded that the plaintiffs established that Act 43 burdened 
Democratic voters for two election cycles by impeding their ability to 
translate votes into seats.86 
5.  Justification 
Finally, under the third prong, the court evaluated whether the 
partisan effects of Act 43 were justified under “legitimate state 
prerogatives and neutral factors that are implicated in the districting 
process.”87 To this end, the defendants established that Wisconsin’s 
geography did give the Republican party a natural, but slight, advantage 
in districting, as Democratic voters were concentrated in mostly urban 
areas.88 However, the court rejected the defendants’ explanation as an 
adequate justification for the partisan effect produced by Act 43.89 The 
court noted that the plan’s drafters generated multiple district reports 
that met legitimate districting criteria and did not create the same 
partisan advantage as the map that ultimately became Act 43.90 Based on 
this evidence, the court concluded that the burden for Democratic voters 
created by Act 43 was not justifiable under the circumstances.91 
 
 84. The EG measures the amount of “packing” and “cracking” of a given party’s voters in any a 
district. It compares the number of “wasted votes” for each party by looking at the number of votes cast 
for a losing candidate in each district and the number of votes cast for the winning candidate in each 
district over the fifty percent needed to win. The EG is the difference between the number of “wasted” 
votes for each party divided by the overall all number of votes cast in the election. Therefore, the more 
favorable a party’s EG is the less votes that party “wasted” in the election, meaning fewer votes were 
cast in excess of what was needed to win a district. Thus, the votes were used more efficiently by one 
party and allowed that party greater ease in translating votes cast into legislative seats. Id. at 903-04; see 
also Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency 
Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831 (2015). 
 85. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 905-06. 
 86. Id. at 910. 
 87. Id. at 911. 
 88. Id. at 911-19. 
 89. Id. at 926-27. 
 90. Id. at 923-24. 
 91. Id.. 
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6.  Outcome and Remedies of Whitford 
The court deferred on granting remedies, and instead ordered 
briefings on the appropriate remedy and evidence thereof.92 After 
receiving and reviewing the parties’ responses to this order, the court 
then made a ruling on the appropriate remedy for the case. 93 While both 
parties agreed that an injunction against further use of Act 43 districting 
was appropriate, they disagreed as to who would redraw the district 
map.94  The plaintiffs urged the court to redistrict in this case; however, 
the court deferred to the legislature to redistrict the map.95 Balancing the 
harm already suffered by the people of Wisconsin under this 
apportionment plan with the defendants’ right to appeal before the 
Supreme Court, the district court set November 1, 2017, as the date for 
enactment of a contingent replacement districting plan.96  Finally, based 
on considerations of harm to the plaintiffs and the defendants, the court 
declined to stay its judgment pending appeal of the case to the Supreme 
Court.97 
III.  DISCUSSION 
With the Whitford standard now established in Wisconsin, the next 
stop for the parties will be the Supreme Court.98 However, with the 
general sense of confusion surrounding the Court’s jurisprudence on 
partisan gerrymandering, the outcome of any such appeal is uncertain. 
Therefore, the object of this section will be to evaluate how the test 
articulated in Whitford presents a manageable standard that the Court 
should adopt to adjudicate claims of partisan gerrymandering. 
Therefore, subsection (a) first addresses the importance of adjudicating 
partisan gerrymandering claims; and subsection (b) discusses some 
important factors to have in a judicially manageable standard for 
adjudicating partisan gerrymanders claims and why the Whitford test 
presents a standard that the Court should adopt. 
 
 92. Id. at 930. 
 93. Whitford v. Gill, 15-cv-421-bbc 2017 U.S. Dist. Lexis 11380, at *2 (W.D. Wis. 2017). 
 94. Whitford v. Gill, No. 15-cv-421-bbc, 2017 U.S. Dist. Lexis 11380, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 27, 
2017). 
 95. Id. at *1-4. 
 96. Id. at *6.  
 97. Id. at *5-6. 
 98. Gill v. Whitford, No. 16-1161, 2017 U.S. S.Ct. Briefs Lexis 1111 (2017); District courts of 
three judges are required to be convened when challenges are made to the constitutionality of 
apportionment of either congressional districts of statewide legislative bodies. 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1984). 
Decisions from a three-judge district court decision are appealable directly to the Supreme Court. 28 
U.S.C. § 1253 (1948).  
11
Aguilera: Drawing the Line: Whitford v. Gill and the Search for Manageable
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
786 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86 
A.  The Dangers of Continued Inaction and Confusion 
Critics argue that the problem of partisan gerrymandering is not likely 
to self-perpetuate and, therefore, the lack of judicially manageable 
standards is unproblematic.99 Difficulties such as achieving and 
maintaining control of both state congressional bodies and the 
governorship, as well as shifting demographics and risk-avoidance of 
legislators are arguable checks on partisan gerrymandering.100 However, 
the continuous litigation in this area points to a different conclusion, one 
in which the problems of partisan gerrymandering will continue to affect 
electoral processes, and the continued presence of partisan 
gerrymandering in our electoral system should not be confused with 
normalcy or benignity.  
1.  Partisan Gerrymandering Is a Continuous Harm to the Democratic 
Process 
The Court’s continuous schism over issues of partisan 
gerrymandering likely allows the practice to flourish and continue 
indefinitely as it remains unchecked. The Court’s inability to address the 
issue of partisan gerrymandering has sent the message that “as long as a 
plan was based on ‘political behavior,’ virtually anything was 
constitutionally permissible.”101 This is because cases have 
demonstrated that such gerrymanders can be perpetrated in districting 
with no threat of invalidation by the Court.102 
This trend is particularly troublesome when considering that elected 
officials are meant to be the representatives of the people, and that 
“[g]errymandered districts create less responsive members of 
Congress.”103 Partisan gerrymandering gives elected officials little 
incentive to work towards majority values or work with other members 
of the legislature, because reelection is assured due to the district 
gerrymandering protecting them.104 This situation also exacerbates the 
evermore-polarized ideological positions of representatives who need 
not compete to maintain their seats, and it reduces the incentive to 
 
 99. Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districting in the 
Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1, 65-66 (1985). 
 100. See Id. 
 101. Laughlin McDonald, The Looming 2010 Census: A Proposed Judicially Manageable 
Standard and other reform Options for Partisan Gerrymandering, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 243, 253 
(2009). 
 102. See supra notes 29-48 and accompanying text. 
 103. Joshua Butera, Partisan Gerrymandering and Qualifications Clause, 95 B.U. L. REV. 303, 
310 (2015). 
 104. Id. 
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compromise with other political viewpoints.105 Moreover, partisan 
gerrymandering leads to “the loss of democratic legitimacy that 
presumably follows from free and fair elections because people feel 
their votes no longer effect the outcomes of elections.”106  
2.  Technological Advancements Continue to Enable Partisan 
Gerrymandering 
The continuing development of technologies such as computers may 
greatly facilitate the ability of political parties to conduct partisan 
gerrymandering for their benefit. For example, sophisticated computer 
software was heavily employed in Whitford in the drafting of the district 
maps.107 In the past, the use of computers in partisan gerrymandering 
was dismissed as simply “exaggerated fears of what unscrupulous 
politicians can do with powerful computers.”108 Even the dissent in 
Whitford argued that “[t]he idea of some kind of high-tech stealth 
gerrymander is nothing more than a bugaboo.”109  
However, Whitford demonstrates that such technologies can present 
particularly invidious partisan gerrymandering because they allow for 
the creation of gerrymandered districts that still conform to traditional 
criteria that typically indicates the presence of permissible voting 
districts.110 Even the popular media has commented on the pervasive use 
of computers in creating very effective partisan gerrymandering and the 
lasting effects of such practices.111   
B.  What a Judicially Manageable Standard Should Look Like: Indicia 
from the Court 
Over the years, various members of the Court have tried to articulate 
what a judicially manageable standard for partisan gerrymandering 
should look like. This section compiles some of the salient concerns that 
emerged over the course of the Court’s thirty-year struggle with partisan 
gerrymandering since Bandemer. These factors will then be measured 
 
 105. Id. at 310-11. 
 106. Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 611 
(2002-2003). 
 107. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text. 
 108. Lowenstein, supra note 99, at 67. 
 109. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 943 (W.D. Wis. 2016). 
 110. Supra note 66-68 and accompanying text. 
 111. Bernard Grofman, The Supreme Court Will Examine Partisan Gerrymandering in 2017, 
WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/01/31/the-supreme-court-
will-examine-partisan-gerrymandering-in-2017-that-could-change-the-voting-
map/?utm_term=.5c05b11a132e, (last visited Feb. 26, 2017). 
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against the actions of the district court in Whitford. This section 
articulates why Whitford represents a desirable combination of 
previously articulated standards for measuring partisan gerrymanders, 
but also addresses the issue of how the Court should deal with the 
influence of technology in the area of partisan gerrymandering. Part (i) 
of this section walks through how Whitford compares with the Court’s 
previous articulation for partisan gerrymandering standards, and part (ii) 
addresses some of the advantages that Whitford brings to bear in its test 
for partisan gerrymandering regarding technology. 
1.  Partisan Gerrymandering Standards as Compared to Whitford 
a.  Looking to the First Amendment in Addition to Equal Protection 
Clause for Support 
An alternative basis for approaching partisan gerrymandering claims 
has been to evaluate such claims under the First Amendment.112 Justice 
Stevens articulated this in both Vieth and LULAC.  In his dissent in 
Vieth, Stevens suggested that the plurality erred when it said that strict 
scrutiny should never be applied when evaluating a claim of partisan 
gerrymandering, and instead noted that political association can be 
subject to strict scrutiny on First Amendment grounds.113 For Stevens, 
“political belief and association constitute the core of those activities 
protected by the First Amendment.”114 Stevens reiterated this claim in 
LULAC, noting that the protections of both the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the freedom of political belief and 
association guaranteed by the First Amendment “reflect the fundamental 
duty of the sovereign to govern impartially.”115   
While criticisms have been levied against a First Amendment 
approach116 support also arises for the approach because of its 
preference for a “commitment to neutrality as embodied in the content-
based viewpoint discrimination analysis.”117 Moreover, as the Court has 
expressed such an approach, “[a]t worst would produce results no worse 
than presently yielded with Equal Protection Clause and at best it would 
 
 112. “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . or the right of people 
to peacefully assemble.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 113. Vieth v. Jublirer, 541 U.S. 267, 324 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 114. Id. at 324 (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356 (1976)). 
 115. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 462 (2006) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 116. David Schultz, The Party’s Over: Partisan Gerrymandering and the First Amendment, 36 
CAP. U. L. REV 1, 22-26 (2007) (surveying various critical responses to the suggestion that the First 
Amendment could be used as a supportive basis for partisan gerrymander claims). 
 117. Id. at 53. 
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resolve a vexing problem that the Court has sought to resolve since 
Bandemer.”118 
The plaintiffs in Whitford brought their partisan gerrymandering 
claim, not only under the guarantee of equal protection of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but also under claims that Act 43 burdened their rights 
under the First Amendment.119 The plaintiffs claimed that the 
unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering “unreasonably [burdened] 
their First Amendment rights of association and free speech.”120  
Bringing partisan gerrymandering claims under the First Amendment, 
allows the Court to apply a strict scrutiny analysis because of the 
protections granted for view-point based discrimination.121 Partisan 
claims brought under First Amendment grounds may be more apt to 
receive a strict scrutiny review and, thus, more protection. 
The First Amendment basis in Whitford also addresses one of the 
complaints of Judge Griesbach’s dissent in Whitford. The dissent took 
issue with the fact that the partisan gerrymandering in Whitford did not 
“entrench” the Republican Party, a typical indicator of possible partisan 
gerrymandering for the Supreme Court in the past and also an indicator 
of gerrymandering that violates the protections of the Equal Protection 
Clause.122 Traditionally, the Court considered entrenchment to be when 
a party with only a minority of voter support committed gerrymandering 
in a way so as to maintain control of a legislature.123 Thus, the Court 
looked for the situation in which “a majority of voters in a state are 
consistently deprived of the opportunity to control a branch of 
government.”124 Therefore, under a First Amendment claim the presence 
of entrenchment may not be necessary to support a finding of partisan 
gerrymandering. 
b.  Partisan Gerrymandering Should be Examined at the District Court 
Level 
In Vieth, Justice Stevens argued that cases for partisan 
gerrymandering should be examined at the district court level and on a 
district-by-district basis.125 Stevens favored a district-by-district 
approach because he believed the harm of gerrymandering to be more 
 
 118. Id. at 26.  
 119. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 855 (W.D. Wis. 2016). 
 120. Id.  
 121. Supra notes 112-118 and accompanying text. 
 122. See Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 937-38. 
 123. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 360 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting); League of United Latin 
American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 419 (2006). 
 124. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 937. 
 125. Vieth, 541 U.S. 267 at 328-29. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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cognizable when affecting members of a specific district.126 Stevens 
asserted, “the injury is only cognizable when stated by voters who reside 
in that particular district, otherwise the ‘plaintiff would be asserting only 
a generalized grievance against governmental conduct of which he or 
she does not approve.’”127  
The dissent in Whitford seized upon the fact that, at the district court 
level, the plaintiffs could not point to individual district gerrymandering, 
but instead relied on data from the entire state to make their case.128 The 
dissent found this lack of gerrymandering in districts to be an important 
factor for denying the plaintiffs’ claims.129 However, the Court’s past 
reliance on irregularly shaped districts or the offending of traditional 
districting criteria can no longer be the sole criteria for evaluating such 
claims. Simply put, “the commonly held view that reliance on formal 
criteria such as compactness or equal population can prevent 
gerrymandering is simply wrong.”130  
Part of the reason the gerrymandering in Whitford was so invidious is 
because the drafters went to such great lengths using computers to 
purposefully draw districts that would not raise any red flags but that 
would still achieve maximum Republican Party control in the legislature 
of Wisconsin. As one scholar noted, “[g]errymandering may take place 
even though districts are perfectly regular in appearance.”131 As 
technology improves, so must the standards used to evaluate partisan 
gerrymandering claims, as this problem will likely only become worse, 
especially if the Court cannot articulate a standard for how to deal with 
partisan gerrymandering. Therefore, looking to individual districts as 
indicators of gerrymandering may be insufficient and partisan 
gerrymandering will be better evaluated in the full context of the history 
of the districting plan, as was the case in Whitford.  
c.  Partisan Gerrymandering Claims Should Demonstrate a 
Discriminatory Intent or Purpose on the Part of the Drafters 
The justices have articulated one common theme: the need for 
plaintiffs to demonstrate that the intent or purpose of the challenged 
redistricting plan was for a discriminatory purpose.132  A showing of 
 
 126. Id. at 330-31. 
 127. Id at 330.  
 128. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 939-40. 
 129. See id.  
 130. Bernad Grofman, Criteria for Districting a Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REV. 77, 
88 (1985-1986). 
 131. Id. at 91. 
 132. Vieth v. Jublirer, 541 U.S. 267, 333-36 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Id. at 346 (Souter, J., 
dissenting); League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 475,76 (2006) (Stevens, 
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discriminatory intent or purpose has always been important to the Court 
as proper means to demarcate the line between permissible and 
impermissible partisan favoritism.133 In his concurrence in LULAC, 
Stevens attempted to clarify this intent standard from Vieth to a 
predominant purpose standard in LULAC;134  specifically, he wrote, 
“when a plaintiff can prove that a legislature’s predominant motive in 
drawing a particular district was to disadvantage a politically salient 
group, and that the decision has the intended effect, the plaintiff’s 
constitutional rights have been violated.”135 
Additionally, in Vieth, Souter articulated a five-part test of which the 
first four factors established evidence of intent of the party conducting 
the partisan gerrymandering.136 The first four parts of this test would 
require a plaintiff to demonstrate he or she was a member of a politically 
cohesive group; that the district of which he was a member disregarded 
traditional districting criteria (contiguity, compactness, conformity with 
geographic features, and respect for political subdivisions); and that 
there was a specific correlation between the deviations from traditional 
districting criteria and the distribution of the population of this group. 
Once demonstrating those three requirements, the plaintiff would then 
need to present the Court with a hypothetical district of which his 
residence was a part that adhered to the traditional districting 
principles.137 Finally, the fifth part of the test would require that the 
plaintiff demonstrate that “the defendants acted intentionally to 
manipulate the shape of the district in order to pack or crack [the 
plaintiff’s] group.”138 Though as one criticism points out these factors 
fail to pinpoint what type of harm they are meant to detect.139 The main 
takeaway here is that the element of discriminatory intent should be a 
part of any standard meant to manage the problem of partisan 
gerrymandering. 
The three-part test presented in Whitford incorporates a consideration 
for discriminatory intent or purpose.  The proof of discriminatory intent 
in Whitford was especially important as the defendants claimed that such 
intent did not matter if the districts still adhered to traditional districting 
principles, as they did under Act 43.140 The district court noted that 
 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 133. See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 884-91 (W.D. Wis. 2016).  
 134. Weiss, supra note 26, at 714; LULAC, 548 U.S. at 474 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  
 135. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 474 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 136. Vieth, 541 U.S. 267 at 346-48 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 137. Id. at 346-50. 
 138. Id at 350. 
 139. Weiss, supra note 26, at 715. 
 140. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 888 (W.D. Wis. 2016). 
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simple reliance on traditional districting principles was insufficient 
when evaluating discriminatory intent.141  Instead, the court in 
Whitford focused on the mapmakers’ intent to create a map that 
entrenched Republican Party control by drawing the districting map in 
such a way that ensured continued Republican control of the Wisconsin 
legislature.142 Even the dissent in Whitford admitted that “[i]t is almost 
beyond question that the Republican staff members who drew the Act 
43 maps intended to benefit Republican candidates.”143 The 
discriminatory intent in Whitford was most certainly demonstrated by 
the plaintiffs’ evidence, under the circumstances presented in which 
sophisticated software was used to draw the districts; and it was more 
appropriate than relying on traditional districting principles, as the test 
Souter articulated in Vieth would require.144 
d.  Judicially Manageable Standards Should Measure a Discriminatory 
Effect or Burden 
A showing of discriminatory effect or burden placed on the plaintiff 
bringing a partisan gerrymandering claim has also been a salient feature 
of proposed standards for partisan gerrymandering articulated by the 
Court. For example, in LULAC, Justice Stevens proposed that to 
establish the effects of partisan gerrymandering the plaintiff would need 
to demonstrate three factors being met:145 (1) the plaintiff’s candidate 
would have won the election under the previous districting plan; (2) the 
plaintiff’s residence is now in a district that is a “safe seat” for the other 
party’s member; and (3) the new district is less compact than the 
previous one.146  
The second factor of the test applied in Whitford went to the issue of 
discriminatory effects of Act 43. An important factor in evaluating 
discriminatory effect for the court in Whitford was that two elections 
had taken place since the districts in Act 43 were put in place.147 In both 
the 2012 and 2014 elections, Democrats garnered a much higher 
percentage of the vote as compared to the seats that they actually won 
based on that voting percentage.148 As Justice Kennedy articulated in 
LULAC, a districting plan “that more closely reflects the distribution of 
 
 141. Id. at 888-89. 
 142. See id. at 894-96. 
 143. Id. at 934. 
 144. Supra notes 136-139 and accompanying text. 
 145. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 476 (2006) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 146. Id. 
 147. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 902. 
 148. Supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text. 
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state party power seems a less likely vehicle for partisan 
discrimination.”149 The court in Whitford correctly observed that the 
strong deviation from the statewide distribution of power demonstrated 
the opposite to be true and that Act 43 was a vehicle for partisan 
gerrymandering.150  
Moreover, the district court also emphasized that, because the election 
results were present in this case, the issue of basing the discriminatory 
effect on hypotheticals was not present, which had troubled members of 
the Court in the past.151 Finally, use of EG by the plaintiffs as a 
significant factor to support the claim that their representational rights 
were burdened under Act 43 also demonstrated a significant and reliable 
measure for effect not previously employed in such claims.152   
e.  Inclusion of the Efficiency Gap versus the Symmetry Standard 
In the past, the Court hinted that a symmetry standard might be 
acceptable for measuring partisan gerrymandering.153 The symmetry 
standard measures partisan bias, and requires that similarly situated 
political parties be treated the same by the electoral system.154 This 
standard is satisfied when “a district plan does not discriminate between 
the parties with respect to the conversion of votes to seats and vice 
versa.”155  
In LULAC, members of the Court expressed interest in the idea of a 
symmetry standard.156 Justices Stevens was enthusiastic in his support of 
the symmetry standard157 and Justice Souter also indicated that the 
standard bore some usefulness and that further exploration was 
warranted.158 Additionally, Justice Kennedy, though with a few 
reservations, also showed openness to partisan symmetry as a measure 
of partisan gerrymandering.159 However, after LULAC, the symmetry 
standard was not asserted for partisan gerrymandering claims, despite 
the Court’s seeming receptiveness to such a standard.160  
The plaintiffs in Whitford did not rely on a symmetry standard, but 
 
 149. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 419. 
 150. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 902. 
 151. Id. at 903. 
 152. Supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text; Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 903. 
 153. See generally LULAC, 548 U.S. at 419-20. 
 154. Id. at 466 (J. Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 155. Stephanopoulos, supra note 85, at 843. 
 156. Id. at 842. 
 157. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 466 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 158. Id. at 483-84 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 159. Stephanopoulos, supra note 84, at 844-45. 
 160. Id. at 846. 
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instead on the EG as an indicator of partisan gerrymandering. 161  While 
the Supreme Court has expressed interest in the symmetry standard,162 
the EG is superior to the symmetry standard as a measure of partisan 
gerrymandering.163 Instead of requiring hypothetical election results, the 
EG uses actual election results to calculate wasted votes.164 Proponents 
of the EG argue that “[t]he efficiency gap provides exactly what litigants 
and courts have long been missing: a reliable assessment of plans’ 
partisan implications.”165 Thus, the EG fixes the exact apprehension 
expressed by Kennedy in LULAC as to the adoption of a partisan 
symmetry standard; the danger of relying on hypothetical results to 
determine if district gerrymandering took place.166  
2.  Why Traditional Tests for Partisan Gerrymandering May No Longer 
Be Functional: Addressing the Pervasive Use of Technology in Partisan 
Gerrymandering 
Another advantage of the Whitford test is that it addresses the issue of 
technology, specifically computers and computer software in the 
drawing of redistricting maps. As previously mentioned, the defendants 
in Whitford worked extensively with computer software and computer 
generated models to create not only the most advantageous map, but one 
that would also not offend traditionally acceptable districting criteria.167 
One problem that the dissent in Whitford pointed out to the majority 
opinion was that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate how any of the 
district lines created under Act 43 offended traditional redistricting 
principles, such as compactness, continuity, and respect for political 
boundaries.168 In fact, this was a defense that the defendants presented 
for Act 43, “a redistricting plan that ‘is consistent with, and not a radical 
departure from, prior plans with respect to traditional districting 
principles’ cannot as a matter of law, evince an unconstitutional 
intent.”169 
However, the dissent in Whitford missed the important point that part 
of the drafters’ intent behind Act 43 was specifically to avoid offending 
traditional principles of districting and yet to enact a districting scheme 
that would ensure the Republicans won any possible election scenario in 
 
 161. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 903. 
 162. See supra notes 155-156 and accompanying text. 
 163. Stephanopoulos, supra note 84, at 896. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 868. 
 166. Id.at 896-97. 
 167. Supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text; supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text. 
 168. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 940 (W.D. Wis. 2016). 
 169. Id. at 888. 
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the state.170 A takeaway from Whitford is that, in the computer age, 
traditional districting criteria may be insufficient to identify when 
discriminatory gerrymandering has taken place.  Therefore, while 
traditional indicators of permissible districts should not be disregarded, 
physical indicators of gerrymandering can no longer be solely relied 
upon as indicators of an intent to create partisan gerrymandering. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Claims of partisan gerrymandering are unlikely to disappear on their 
own and courts will likely continue to attempt resolution of such claims. 
Finding a manageable standard is essential for the Court to deal with 
these claims and the Court must deal with these claims. A continued 
failure to articulate what is permissible in this area will allow further 
exploitation of the Court’s contradicting articulations. Continued 
inaction undermines the power of voters and the legitimacy of the 
electoral system.  As one news report noted, the real rigged voting 
system is gerrymandering.171   
The Whitford test presents a workable standard for which the Court 
has been searching, and it even offers more. Whitford also addresses the 
issue of computer districting and the failures of traditional districting 
criteria, and it presents a standard for districting in the twenty-first 
century that the Court can manage. 
 
 
 
 
 170. Supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text. 
 171. Despite tremendous dissatisfaction which Congress, ninety-seven percent of incumbents 
were reelected to the House of Representative in the 2016 election, which critics cite as the results of 
systematic gerrymandering. Sarah McCammon, Redistricting Reform Advocates Say the Real ‘Rigged 
System’ is Gerrymandering, NPR, http://www.npr.org/2017/03/18/520551499/redistricting-reform-
advocates-say-the-real-rigged-system-is-
gerrymandering?utm_source=npr_newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_content=20170318&utm_cam
paign=npr_email_a_friend&utm_term=storyshare (Mar. 18, 2017, 6:00 PM). 
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